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Plaintiff Keith F. Bell, Ph.D. (“Plaintiff”) brings suit against Defendants the Chicago Cubs 
Baseball Club (the “Cubs”) and Joshua Lifrak (“Lifrak”) (collectively, “Defendants”) for 
copyright infringement.  Currently before the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the 
governing amended complaint.  See [21].  For the following reasons, Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss [21] is granted in part and denied in part.  The claim for contributory copyright 
infringement and the claim for direct copyright infringement as to the Cubs only are dismissed.  
The claim for vicarious copyright infringement and the claim for direct copyright infringement 
against Lifrak will be allowed to proceed.  This case is set for status hearing on February 20, 2020 
at 9:00 a.m. 
I. Background1 
 According to the amended complaint, Plaintiff is an accomplished athlete and coach and 
“an internationally-recognized sports psychology and performance consultant” who has worked 
with hundreds of sports teams and spoken at “national and international coaching symposia.”  [18] 
 
1 For purposes of Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court assumes as true all well-pled allegations set 
forth in Plaintiff’s amended complaint.  See [18]; Calderon-Ramirez v. McCament, 877 F.3d 272, 275 (7th 
Cir. 2017). 
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at 2-3.  Plaintiff has also “authored and had published 10 books and over 80 articles relating to 
sports psychology and sports performance” and written columns for various sports periodicals.  Id. 
at 3.  At issue in this case is Plaintiff’s book entitled “Winning Isn’t Normal.”  Id.  Plaintiff wrote 
the book in 1981 and it was first published in 1982.  According to Plaintiff, “[t]he book has enjoyed 
substantial acclaim, distribution, and publicity.”  Id.  Plaintiff is the sole author of the book and 
continues to own all rights in the work.   
 Plaintiff holds a copyright registration for “Winning Isn’t Normal,” which was issued by 
the U.S. Copyright Office on September 21, 1989 (registration number TX-0002-6726-44).  Since 
Plaintiff published the book, “he has and continues to promote, distribute, offer for sale, and sell 
numerous copies of the work.”  [18] at 3.  As part of these efforts, Plaintiff creates, markets, and 
sells works derivative of “Winning Isn’t Normal,” such as posters and t-shirts that display the 
following passage from the book, which Plaintiff labels the “WIN Passage”: 
Winning isn’t normal. That doesn’t mean there’s anything wrong with winning. It 
just isn’t the norm. It’s highly unusual. 
 
Every race only has one winner. No matter how many people are entered (not to 
mention all those w o [sic] tried and failed to make cuts), only one person (or one 
relay) wins each event. 
 
Winning is unusual. As such, it requires unusual action. 
 
In order to win, you must do extraordinary things. You can’t just be one of the 
crowd. The crowd doesn’t win. You have to be willing to stand out and act 
differently. 
 
Your actions need to reflect unusual values and priorities. You have to value 
success more than others do. You have to want it more. (Now, take note! Wanting 
it more is a decision you make and act upon - not some inherent quality or burning 
inner drive or inspiration!) And you have to make that value a priority. 
 
You can’t train like everyone else. You have to train more and train better. 
 
You can’t talk like everyone else. You can’t think like everyone else. You can’t be 
too willing to join the crowd, to do what is expected, to act in a socially accepted 
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manner, to do what’s “in.” You need to be willing to stand out in the crowd and 
consistently take exceptional action. If you want to win, you need to accept the risks 
and perhaps the loneliness ... because winning isn’t normal!! 
 
[18-2] at 2.  According to Plaintiff, the WIN Passage is viewed by him “and others as the heart of 
[his] literary work” “Winning Isn’t Normal.”  Id. at 4.  Plaintiff obtained a separate copyright 
registration for the WIN Passage (registration no. TX 8-503-571).   
 Plaintiff also owns the domain winningisntnormal.com, which points to a website where 
Plaintiff offers the book and derivative works for sale.  Further, Plaintiff obtained a trademark 
registration for “Winning Isn’t Normal” for “[p]rinted matter, namely, non-fiction publications, 
*** books, booklets, pamphlets, articles, manuals and posters in the field of sports, fitness, and 
competitive performance and psychology” (registration no. 4,630,749).  [18] at 5.  Plaintiff alleges 
that the mark “Winning Isn’t Normal” “has become widely associated” with him and his printed 
materials and related goods and that the mark “is indicative to consumers that printed material and 
related items bearing” the mark “originate from or are affiliated with, sponsored, or approved” by 
Plaintiff.  Id.   
 This case involves Defendant Lifrak’s “retweet” of the WIN passage on Twitter.  Lifrak is 
employed by the Cubs as the director of its Mental Skills Program.  Lifrak’s job responsibilities 
“include issues that generally fall within sports psychology.”  [18] at 5.  At the time relevant to 
this action, Lifrak maintained an active Twitter account and had more than 1,000 “followers.”  
Around May 2016, Lifrak allegedly posted an exact copy of the WIN passage on his Twitter 
account.  The print-out from Lifrak’s Twitter account, which Plaintiff attached as Exhibit C to the 
amended complaint, shows that Lifrak’s tweet was a “retweet” of a tweet from Moawad 
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Consulting.  [18-3].2  The printout shows that the tweet did not attribute the WIN passage to 
Plaintiff.  See id.  Lifrak’s retweet was “liked” at least 14 times and “retweeted” at least 9 times.  
[18] at 7.  According to Plaintiff, Lifrak’s retweet “was an act of copying by Defendants under 
applicable law *** because actual copies of ‘Winning Isn’t Normal’ were made, which existed on 
servers, devices, and computer systems owned or controlled by Defendants.”  Id. at 6-7. 
 According to Plaintiff, the Cubs are responsible for Lifrak’s Twitter activity.  Plaintiff 
alleges that Lifrak maintains the Twitter account “in the course and scope of his employment with 
[the] Cubs and his followers include many players and coaches” within the Cubs organization.  
[18] at 6.  Plaintiff further alleges that at all relevant times, the Cubs “possessed the right and 
ability to supervise [Lifrak’s] infringing activity,” had “a direct financial interest in [Lifrak’s] 
infringing activities,” and can and should have “exercised its right and ability to supervise the 
activities” of Lifrak on Twitter.  Id.  Plaintiff elaborates that the Cubs “knew that individuals 
associated with its organization” follow Lifrak on Twitter and that Lifrak’s infringing behavior 
“concerned the same subject matter that *** Lifrak is paid to work on as part of his employment” 
with the Cubs.  Id.  Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that the Cubs knowingly “induced, 
caused, and materially contributed to” Lifrak’s allegedly infringing activity, because the Cubs 
“know[] about, encourage[], and contribute[] to the exact activity *** that is at issue in this case.”  
Id.  In addition, Plaintiff alleges, “Defendants’ infringements of [his] copyrighted works were 
commercial in nature as they were meant to publicize and promote Defendants, and to carry out 
the purposes of Defendant Lifrak’s job with Defendant Cubs for which he is compensated because 
he brings economic benefit to Defendant Cubs and himself.”  Id. at 7.  Plaintiff further alleges that 
 
2 According to Defendant, Plaintiff also sued Moawad for copyright infringement for the original tweet; 
that case was eventually settled.  See [22] at 7 (citing Bell v. Moawad Group LLC, et al., No. 17-cv-02109 
(D. Ariz. 2018)).  
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“Defendants’ infringement profoundly effects the market for [his] work because people will not 
have to purchase his book and his other materials that incorporate the WIN passage on his web 
site.”  Id.  
 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff asserts three claims: (1) a claim for direct copyright 
infringement against both Defendants; (2) a claim for vicarious copyright infringement against the 
Cubs; and (3) a claim for contributory copyright infringement against the Cubs.  Currently before 
the Court is Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state a claim.    
II. Legal Standard 
 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint.  For purposes of 
a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court “‘accept[s] as true all of the well-pleaded facts 
in the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.’”  Calderon-Ramirez, 
877 F.3d at 275 (quoting Kubiak v. City of Chicago, 810 F.3d 476, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2016)).  To 
survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff’s complaint must allege facts which, 
when taken as true, “‘plausibly suggest that the plaintiff has a right to relief, raising that possibility 
above a speculative level.’”  Cochran v. Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 828 F.3d 597, 599 (7th 
Cir. 2016) (quoting EEOC v. Concentra Health Servs., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007)).  The 
Court reads the amended complaint and assesses its plausibility as a whole.  See Atkins v. City of 
Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011).  In addition, it is proper for the Court to “consider, in 
addition to the allegations set forth in the complaint itself, documents that are attached to the 
complaint, documents that are central to the complaint and are referred to in it, and information 
that is properly subject to judicial notice.”  Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th Cir. 
2013) (citing Geinosky v. City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 745 n.1 (7th Cir.2012)); see also Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 10(c). 





A. Direct Copyright Infringement 
Count I of the amended complaint alleges a claim for copyright infringement against 
“Defendants.”  [18] at 8-9.  “To establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must prove two 
elements: ‘(1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work 
that are original.’”  Design Basics, LLC v. Lexington Homes, Inc., 858 F.3d 1093, 1099 (7th Cir. 
2017) (quoting JCW Investments, Inc. v. Novelty, Inc., 482 F.3d 910, 914 (7th Cir. 2007)). 
In their motion to dismiss, Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s allegation that he holds 
valid copyrights to “Winning Isn’t Normal” and the WIN passage.  Instead, their motion to dismiss 
focusing on the “copying” element of Plaintiff’s copyright claim.  To the extent that Plaintiff 
intends to bring his direct copyright infringement claim against the Cubs, that claim is dismissed 
because the amended complaint does not allege any facts suggesting that “the Cubs” themselves 
created a copy of Plaintiff’s WIN passage.  Instead, the amended complaint alleges that Lifrak 
created the copy by “retweeting” the Moawad tweet. 
Whether Lifrak himself created a “copy” is a more difficult question which, ultimately, this 
Court is unable to resolve at this early stage of the case.  Defendants argue that, pursuant to the 
standard set out in Flava Works, Inc. v. Gunter, 689 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2012), and its progeny, “a 
new copy is created only when a third party stores the infringing material on its own servers.”  
[22] at 10; see Flava Works, 689 F.3d at 762 (holding that defendant’s electronic linking of users 
of its website to the plaintiff’s copyrighted videos could not support a claim for copyright 
infringement because the defendant did not actually create a new copy of the material on its 
servers, but merely linked to material hosted on third-party servers, albeit deceptively).  By 
contrast, Defendants contend, “a mere link or direction back (like a retweet) to the original source 
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of a pre-existing post is not a new copy and, therefore, does not give rise to an independent 
infringement claim.”  Id. (citing Leveyfilm, Inc. v. Fox Sports Interactive Media, LLC, 2014 WL 
3368893, *5 (N.D. Ill. July 8, 2014) (holding that because defendant’s website linked to—but 
never downloaded—plaintiff’s copyrighted photo onto its own servers, the site “did not copy the 
photo,” and its owner could not be liable for infringement)).  Defendants argue that a retweet 
cannot, as a matter of law, generate an “actionable copy” of copyrighted material, because “[t]he 
instructions, storage, management, and reflection back to the original tweet all were governed 
exclusively by Twitter and took place exclusively on Twitter’s servers.”  [22] at 11. 
Assuming without deciding that Defendants’ statement of the governing legal standard is 
correct, the Court nonetheless cannot resolve this issue on a motion to dismiss because it rests on 
facts that are not alleged in—and are contrary to—the governing amended complaint.  According 
to the amended complaint, Lifrak’s act of retweeting the Moawad tweet resulted in “actual copies 
of ‘Winning Isn’t Normal’ [to be] made, which existed on servers, devices, and computer systems 
owned or controlled by Defendants.”  [18] at 6-7.  Plaintiff’s allegations may very well be wrong 
as a factual matter, but at this stage of the case, the Court cannot simply rely on Defendants’ 
technological explanation of Twitter to dismiss Plaintiff’s claim.  Defendants contend that the 
Court may also take judicial notice of information contained on various Twitter-operated web 
pages explaining how a “retweet” works.  See [22] at 11, n.4 (citing Anderson v. Simon, 217 F.3d 
472, 475 (7th Cir. 2000)).  It is not clear that these web-based explanations constitute “public 
records” of which it is appropriate to take judicial notice.  See, e.g., Parungao v. Community Health 
Systems, Inc., 858 F.3d 452, 457 (7th Cir. 2017) (noting that even matters of public record cannot 
be judicially noticed unless “the accuracy of those documents reasonably cannot be questioned”).  
But even if they were, none of the sources cited by Defendants address the question of whether 
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someone who retweets an original tweet might somehow also store the underlying copyrighted 
material on his or her own server.  See [22] at 12.  Although the Court must deny Defendants’ 
motion to dismiss the copyright infringement claim against Lifrak, if and when Defendants 
generate a factual record to support their contention that judgment in their favor as a matter of law 
is appropriate, they may move for summary judgment at any time.  
B. Contributary Copyright Infringement 
 Count III of the amended complaint alleges a claim for contributory copyright infringement 
against the Cubs.  “‘Liability for contributory infringement will be imposed when a defendant, 
with knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes or materially contributes to the 
infringing conduct of another.’”  Myers v. Harold, 279 F. Supp. 3d 778, 796 (N.D. Ill. 2017) 
(quoting Marobie–FL, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Fire Equip. Distributors, 983 F. Supp. 1167, 1178 
(N.D. Ill. 1997)).  
 Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s claim for contributory copyright infringement must be 
dismissed because, among other reasons, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts that plausibly suggest 
that the Cubs had any “knowledge of” Lifrak’s allegedly “infringing activity.”  Myers, 279 F. 
Supp. 3d at 796.  The Court agrees.  “The knowledge element for contributory copyright 
infringement is met in those cases where a party has been notified of specific infringing uses of its 
technology and fails to act to prevent future such infringing uses, or willfully blinds itself to such 
infringing uses.”  Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 2d 877, 886 (N.D. Ill. 
2005); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929 (2005) 
(“One infringes contributorily by intentionally inducing or encouraging direct infringement[.]”  
(emphasis added)).  The amended complaint contains no facts from which it could plausibly be 
inferred that the Cubs knew that Lifrak was infringing Plaintiff’s copyright, yet failed to act to stop 
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the infringement or willfully blinded themselves to the infringement.  The print-out of Lifrak’s 
retweet (which is attached as an exhibit to the amended complaint) shows that Moawad 
Consulting’s tweet does not attribute the WIN passage to Plaintiff.  Therefore there is no apparent 
way that the Cubs (or Lifrak, for that matter) would have known that Lifrak’s retweet infringed 
Plaintiff’s copyright.  Plaintiff does not allege, for instance, that he notified the Cubs (or Lifrak) 
that they were using his copyrighted material without permission and Defendants refused to take 
the retweet down.  Therefore, Defendants’ motion to dismiss the claim for contributory copyright 
infringement is granted.  See Monotype Imagine, 376 F. Supp. 2d at 886-87 (holding that even if 
distributors of font software established that competitor’s licensees had engaged in acts of 
infringement of distributors’ software, they did not show that competitor knew its licensees were 
using its font technology to do so, as required for competitor’s liability for contributory copyright 
infringement).  
C. Vicarious Liability for Copyright Infringement 
Count II of the amended complaint alleges a claim for vicarious liability for copyright 
infringement against the Cubs.  “To prevail on a claim for vicarious copyright infringement, a 
plaintiff must establish that ‘the defendant has (1) the right and ability to supervise the infringing 
conduct and (2) a direct financial interest in the infringing activity.’”  GC2 Inc. v. Int’l Game Tech. 
PLC, 255 F. Supp. 3d 812, 824 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (quoting Perfect 10, Inc. v. Giganews, Inc., 847 
F.3d 657, 673 (9th Cir. 2017)).  “Unlike contributory liability, one can be liable for vicarious 
copyright infringement even without knowledge of the infringement.”  In re Aimster Copyright 
Litigation, 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 654 (N.D. Ill. 2002); see also Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, 545 
U.S. at 931 n.9 (explaining that the vicarious liability theory “allows imposition of liability when 
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the defendant profits directly from the infringement and has a right and ability to supervise the 
direct infringer, even if the defendant initially lacks knowledge of the infringement”).  
 In their motion to dismiss, Defendants challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s pleading as 
to both the supervision element and the direct financial interest element of the vicarious liability 
claim.  At this stage, the Court is not persuaded by either argument and therefore will allow 
Plaintiff’s claim for vicarious liability for copyright infringement to proceed.  With that said, the 
Court is skeptical that Plaintiff will be able to prove the second element of the claim. 
 Concerning the supervision element, Defendants argue that “Plaintiff has not pleaded any 
facts establishing that the Chicago Cubs maintains the right to police or restrict Lifrak’s personal 
social-media presence, or that it otherwise regulates the content of his Twitter feed in any way.”  
[22] at 17.  But the amended complaint alleges just that: “At all relevant times, Defendant Cubs 
possessed the right and ability to supervise, control, or stop the infringing conduct described herein 
as it occurred over the course of Defendant Lifrak’s use of his social media accounts in association 
with Defendant Cubs.”  [18] at 9, ¶ 48.  Taking Plaintiff’s allegations as true, as the Court must 
for purposes of a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff has adequately alleged that the Cubs have “the right 
and ability to supervise and control” Lifrak’s alleged infringement.  GC2, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 824; 
see also Porter v. Combs, 105 F. Supp. 3d 872, 879 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (logo designer’s allegations 
that owner of lacrosse club had supervisory authority over club’s infringing activities was 
sufficient to survive motion to dismiss; plaintiff not required to plead specific facts concerning 
“extent and nature” of defendant’s supervisory authority). 
 The Court now turns to the “financial interest” element of Plaintiff’s claim.  For purposes 
of a vicarious copyright infringement claim, “a financial benefit exists where there is evidence of 
a direct financial gain or that the ‘availability of infringing material acts as a draw for customers.’”  
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GC2, 255 F. Supp. 3d at 825 (quoting Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2004)) 
(emphasis added).  The second type of financial interest exists “where the availability of an 
infringing work is a contributing factor in a consumer’s decision to purchase a product or service.”  
Id.  Importantly, “[t]he size of the ‘draw’ relative to a defendant’s overall business is immaterial.’”  
Id. (citing Perfect 10, 847 F.3d at 673).  “Under either method of proof, ‘[t]he essential aspect of 
the ‘direct financial benefit’ inquiry is whether there is a causal relationship between the infringing 
activity and any financial benefit a defendant reaps, regardless of how substantial the benefit is in 
proportion to a defendant’s overall profits.’”  Id. (quoting Ellison, 357 F.3d at 1079); see also 
Flava Works, Inc. v. Clavio, 2012 WL 2459146, at *4 (N.D. Ill. June 27, 2012).  
 Defendants argue that the amended complaint does not identify “any financial benefit 
inuring to the Chicago Cubs as a result of Lifrak’s tweet.”  [22] at 18.  However, Plaintiff alleges 
in ¶ 49 of the amended complaint that “Defendant Cubs had a direct and financial interest in 
Defendant Lifrak’s infringing activity, including without limitation receiving the benefit of 
Defendant Lifrak’s social media audience and the promotional engagement generated thereform 
[sic] based on Defendant Lifrak’s social media activity.”  [18] at 9.  In other words, Plaintiff’s 
theory appears to be that all of Lifrak’s tweets increase the exposure of the Cubs and encourage 
Lifrak’s followers to buy services and products from the Cubs, such as tickets to baseball games 
or Cubs-licensed apparel and other items.  Defendants question the plausibility of this theory, 
arguing that “the retweet in question [did not] contain any overt advertising or even mention the 
Chicago Cubs.”  [22] at 18-19.  However, the print-out from Lifrak’s Twitter account shows that 
Lifrak identifies himself as “Director of The Mental Skills Program of the Chicago Cubs,” and 
uses a photo of the Cubs’ sign at Wrigley Field as the banner for his Twitter page.  Therefore, it is 
not wholly implausible to presume that Lifrak’s Twitter activity is intended to promote the Cubs.  
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At the same time, Plaintiff may find it difficult to marshal any actual evidence that Lifrak’s single 
retweet of the WIN passage resulted in a direct financial gain to the Cubs or actually drew 
customers to the Cubs.  See, e.g., Monotype Imaging, Inc. v. Bitstream, Inc., 2005 WL 936882, at 
*7 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 2005) (granting summary judgment for defendant on plaintiff’s vicarious 
copyright infringement claim, where plaintiffs failed to come forward with “any evidence 
demonstrating” that defendant’s allegedly infringing use of plaintiff’s software acted as “a 
‘tremendous draw’” for defendant’s customers).  But for purposes of Defendants’ motion to 
dismiss, Plaintiff’s allegations are sufficient—though just barely—to allow the contributory 
copyright infringement claim to proceed.  See Porter, 105 F. Supp. 3d at 879 (explaining that to 
survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiff was not required to plead “specific financial gains” earned 
by owner of lacrosse club due to club’s infringing use of plaintiff’s logo on apparel, merchandise 
and team equipment).  
D. Willful and Intentional Conduct 
The amended complaint alleges that Defendants’ copying of the WIN passage “was done 
willfully and intentionally in violation of federal copyright law, with knowledge that no agreement 
had been reached with Plaintiff regarding such copying, and with knowledge that neither a license 
nor an assignment had been granted to Defendants allowing them to copy or use the Infringed 
Works.”  [18] at 8.  Defendants argue that any allegations of willfulness should be dismissed 
because “Plaintiff has not even alleged that Lifrak, much less the Chicago Cubs, knew (and if so, 
how) that the Moawad Tweet contained copyrighted material.”  [22] at 19.  Plaintiff responds that 
willfulness is not a required element of any of his claims and, therefore, this is not a proper ground 
for a motion to dismiss.  Rather, Plaintiff explains, allegations of willfulness go “to the question 
of whether [Plaintiff] is entitled to increased damages pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).”  [27] at 
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16.  In reply, Defendants assert that “[w]hile it is true that Plaintiff need not prove his claim now, 
he must still adequately allege ‘the additional intent element’ required for claims of willful 
infringement.”  [28] at 11 (citing  Design Basics, LLC v. WK Olson Architects, Inc., 2018 WL 
3629309, at *4 n.6 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2018)). 
Plaintiff is correct that his claims are not subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) based on 
a lack of factual detail supporting his allegation that Defendants infringed his trademarks 
knowingly and willfully.  Nonetheless, the Court agrees with Defendants that there is nothing in 
the amended complaint to suggest that either Defendant had any idea that the Moawad tweet 
contained copyrighted material.  Further, the Court is skeptical that Defendant will ever be able to 
establish knowledge or willfulness, given that the Moawad tweet did not attribute the WIN quote 
to Plaintiff.  While this is not a basis for dismissing the complaint, it is certainly something for 
Plaintiff to keep in mind in considering how much of his own resources to sink into this case, as 
he will need evidentiary support for any claim to more than the $200 minimum statutory damages 
available under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2).  
IV. Conclusion 
For these reasons, Defendants’ motion to dismiss [21] is granted in part and denied in part.  
The claim for contributory copyright infringement and the claim for direct copyright infringement 
as to the Cubs only are dismissed.  The claim for vicarious copyright infringement and the claim 
for direct copyright infringement against Lifrak will be allowed to proceed.  This case is set for 
status hearing on February 20, 2020 at 9:00 a.m. 
 
Dated: February 4, 2020          
        ____________________________ 
        Robert M. Dow, Jr. 
        United States District Judge 
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